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
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STUDY PROJECT

FORCE STRUCTURE - ALO

BY

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

FORCE STRUCTURE - ALO

A GROUP STUDY PROJECT

by

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
6 June 1984

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ABSTRACT

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CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND

Introduction

During the summer of 1982, a team from the Army Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) visited USAREUR. A purpose of this visit was to solicit significant problems which would lend themselves to study solution. USAREUR commanders identified the problem of reduced unit ALOs particularly in support units at echelons above Division. A major cause of this condition was perceived to be the acceptance of new missions by the Army without the provision of compensating manpower to support them and the fielding of new equipment/weapons systems which add personnel requirements--often in support units--without offsets or the provision of additional personnel. Related to this issue was the scheduling of new equipment fielding which, in the aggregate, may reduce support capabilities by overwhelming the support base with requirements to:

- a. Process old equipment while participating in the fielding of the new.
- b. Absorb hidden new supply and maintenance functions and workloads associated with supporting the new system--greater in scope than support required of the old system.
- c. Accommodate the conversion and training of personnel to meet the MOS or equipment specific demands of the new system.

Statement of the Problem

The ALO of USAREUR units, particularly support units at echelons above Division, are falling. This condition is due, largely, to the acceptance by the Army of new missions without the receipt of compensating personnel resources and by the fielding of new equipment systems which increase personnel requirements without similar increased personnel allocations. Related to this problem is a degradation of the capability of support units due to the simultaneous fielding of numerous equipment systems which peaks work load and alters the skill requirements of their personnel.

CHAPTER II

STUDY METHOD AND TECHNIQUES

Method and Techniques

The descriptive research method was used to identify policy associated with equipment modernization/fielding, identify the impact in USAREUR of this fielding within selected units, and explore alternatives which might lessen its adverse impact. Other factors adversely affecting personnel strength during the modernization period were also examined.

The study effort included data gathering at three levels:

1. At HQDA level (includes MILPERCEN), research included:

a. Comparison of PERSACS projections to the projected end-strength over the modernization years.

b. Review of pertinent parts of PPBES involving fielding of new equipment to determine any linkage between programming and actual constraints on end-strength.

c. Research of past fielding actions and their impact to identify the degree of responsibility exercised between requirements and the projected personnel inventory.

d. Research of mandated strength ceilings during the modernization period and determine their impact.

e. Research of Unit Status Reporting (USR) in affected units to identify resultant readiness impact.

f. Research into other causes of reduced ALO due to decreased strength during the modernization period.

2. At HQ, USAREUR level (includes 1st PERSCOM), research included:

a. Identifying directed changes in personnel strength during the modernization period.

b. Researching both the planned and actual personnel strengths during the modernization period to determine causes and effects.

c. Reviewing the theater plan to support fielding of new equipment.

d. Researching support levels of MOSs associated with new equipment fielding to include those of the support chain for the new equipment.

3. At Corps level (to include sample subordinate support units), research included:

a. Identifying any directed changes in personnel strengths during the mobilization period.

b. Reviewing Corps PPBES data to identify modernization programming and planning inputs.

c. Reviewing modernization history of selected units.

d. Reviewing strategies capable of offering offsets, e.g., civilianization, host nation support, civilian overhire, reducing overstrengths, reprogramming funds, reduced ALOs.

e. Determining the impact of USAREUR unique PCS constraints modernization.

f. Refining data to insure operational unit perceptions are accurately represented.

Analysis

Analysis was conducted to:

1. Compare requirements with available resources.
2. Identify requirements which were not apparent in the initial fielding process.
3. Quantify net impact of fielding programs.
4. Determine causes for present and projected delta between requirements and available resources.
5. Explore offsetting strategies--attempt to quantify available resources in each strategy.

Desired results included:

1. A review of the impact of recent new equipment fieldings on unit ALOs in USAREUR.
2. Identification of other factors which contributed to these reduced ALOs.
3. Projected strength analysis tied to equipment fieldings.
4. Identification of strategies capable of offsetting a portion of projected shortfalls.

CHAPTER III

THE IMPACT OF JCS PLANNING ON USAREUR ALO DEVELOPMENT

Background

Major conflicts are waged by Air, Land, and Sea Forces in concert with allied efforts. American military forces are committed in support of national objectives through the joint planning process. The National Security Act of 1947 tasks the JCS with preparing strategic plans and providing strategic direction for the Armed Forces. JCS Memorandum of Policy 84 (MOP 84) establishes the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) which is the basis for strategic and force planning.

US Army Europe's forces on the ground have their origin in the JSPS. Joint strategic planning started the process of creating the EUCOM forces whose capabilities would form the basis for theater operational plans. The figure at Annex A to Appendix shows a part of this joint process which includes CINCEUCOM and Army Chief of Staff input.

The JSPS Cycle

The following paragraphs will describe the major events in one cycle of the continuous process of joint planning which impacts upon USAREUR ALO development.

The Joint Long-Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA) looks at the years eleven through twenty in the joint planning process. It is updated every four years (prior to the Presidential election) and reviewed every two years. It further provides a basis for transition from long-range (11-20 years) to mid-range (3-10 years) strategic planning. The JLRSA

consolidates intelligence estimates, strategic forecasts, force structure questions and likely issues. It contains four possible alternative future world environments and presents trends and developments for selected regions and countries based upon specific environmental factors. For each of the four world environments, significant military threats to the interests of the United States are described, and an illustrative strategy to meet those threats is presented.

The JLRSA is the first event in both military and political planning where theater (USAREUR) forces are considered. Numbers of unit/spaces are not addressed in the JLRSA. This force sizing process does not begin until preparation of the Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis (JSPDSA). The JSPDSA is prepared every two years and reviewed annually. It is published in two parts--Part I is, "Strategy and Force Planning Guidance" and Part II is, "Analysis and Force Requirements". The JSPDSA process is the first effort in the Joint Planning System to associate number of forces with national military objectives, strategy and planning guidance.

Part I of the JSPDSA provides specific strategy and force planning guidance to commanders of unified and specified commands and the services. It tasks them to provide comments on its military strategy, objectives and the forces required to execute that strategy. The CINC's input is considered the "Minimum Risk Force" and the Services' input is considered the "Planning Force" (these forces will be discussed in Chapter 4.).

In Part II of the JSPDSA, the JCS develop planning force levels (including their analysis and rationale) which they consider necessary to support the national military strategy with reasonable assurance of

success. The JSPDSA must be comprehensive, timely and current in order to support the annual preparation of the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD).

The annual JSPD is the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council and the President. It serves as a basis for major policy discussions with the Secretary of Defense prior to drafting the Defense Guidance (DG). The JSPD provides a comprehensive military appraisal of the threat to US interests and objectives, worldwide; a statement of recommended military objectives-as derived from National Objectives and the recommended Military Strategy required to attain National Objectives in the mid-range period (years 2-9).

The Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM) provides the views of the JCS to the Secretary of Defense on the adequacy and capabilities of the Program Force in the service POMs to execute the national military strategy. The JPAM process affords the services an opportunity to review cross-service programs which have an impact on total force capabilities. It also provides the CINCs an opportunity to comment on the overall balance of the composite Program Force. The JCS comments on the ability of the Program Force to execute national military strategy and on the allocation of scarce resources. The JPAM serves as a reference for the JCS views on service programs for use in the program review cycle and as a basic source document for the Secretary of Defense in making program decisions.

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) is a key document in the annual joint planning process. It provides JCS guidance to the Unified and Specified Commands and service chiefs. The JSCP is divided into two volumes (Volume I, "Concepts, Tasks and Planning Guidance" and

Volume II, "Forces"). The importance of the JSCP is that it is the one annual document that describes what major forces will be available for planning purposes, assigns tasks, and provides planning guidance for development of operation plans to accomplish the assigned tasks. It also gives planning guidance to the services for support of Unified and Specified commands in execution of the assigned tasks. One section includes military objectives, strategic concepts and a national military strategy for employment of the Current Force (i.e., the force in-being today).

CHAPTER IV

ARMY PLANNING FOR USAREUR'S FORCES

The Process-From the Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis (JSPDSA) to the Army Budget Estimate

The force development process starts when the CINCs of Unified and Specified Commands provide input to the JSPDSA establishing Minimum Risk Force requirements to support their contingency plans. The JSPDSA is a compilation of the Minimum Risk Force necessary to support JCS defensive scenarios. This Minimum Risk Force is fully structured and supported. It is not constrained by fiscal, manpower, logistics, mobility, basing or other limitations. It provides a high degree of assurance of success.

The JSPDSA is a derivative document for the formation of the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) which establishes Planning Force levels to support JCS priority contingencies. This Planning Force offers a reasonable assurance of success in attaining these objectives. It is relatively unconstrained, fully supported, and fully structured. Department of the Army provides input to JSPD force development and the JSPD is used by DOD in developing the Defense Guidance. Concurrent with development of the Defense Guidance, DA develops the Army Guidance, Volume II of which is the Army Plan and contains the Objective Force. The Objective Force gives less than adequate assurance of success. It optimizes in terms of force structure, readiness, modernization, and sustainability the force which is constrained by expected fiscal and manpower levels. The Objective Force is subjected to the sizing and

structuring scenarios provided in the Defense Guidance and the result is the Program Force which appears in the Army POM. The Program Force is constrained by OSD resource projections and offers a higher degree of risk than the Planning Force and is neither fully structured nor fully supported. The Program Force is further modified to conform to OSD guidance and evolves into the Budget Force which forms a basis for the Army's annual Budget Estimate. The Budget Force is more constrained than the Program Force and is less capable and provides greater risk.

The Budget Force is still not the one which is actually fielded to meet JCS military contingencies. The budget process places the service recommendations into the President's Budget which is acted upon by Congress. What results from this process is the Current Force which amounts to whatever the Congress is willing to support.

The size and composition of forces deployed in USAREUR are the result of the process just described and they represent the CINCEUR proposed Minimum Risk Force pared down by resource constraints, subjected to the Army Force Packaging Methodology and supported by Congress.

CHAPTER V

MANPOWER MANAGEMENT FOR USAREUR'S FORCE

From Force Planning to Manpower Management

The force design process described in Chapter 4 results in gross division equivalents and end-strength limits. The process which converts this aggregated data into specific troop lists and unit authorizations involves both unit design and manpower management.

TO&E and TDA Unit Design

The unit design process for both TO&E and TDA organizations is depicted at Annex B to Appendix. It should be noted that the TO&E design process starts with TRADOC where a generic unit, e.g., a Mechanized Infantry Battalion, is specified in a TO&E. Upon DA approval, TO&Es became the basis for the design, by MACOM and others in the field, of MTO&Es which tailor the basic unit design to the theater of operations and the requirements of the mission. MOT&Es also require DA approval and are centrally managed in the areas of Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) and effective date (E-Date). This authorization process is entered in the Force Accounting System (FAS) and field input is provided through The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS).

TDA units are locally designed based on DA Structure and Staffing Guides. The process is interactive between the MACOM and the DA approval authority. Accounting for TDA authorizations is similar to the process used for TO&E authorizations, and the same reporting and accounting systems are used.

Force Management-the Authorization Process

The allocations process is one of setting priorities and distributing shortages. A key element in this process is the publication three times annually of Program Budget Guidance (PBG) which makes manpower allocations to the MACOMs. The PBG is driven by the PPBES and the discrete events of that system used to obtain manpower allocations, e.g., POM, PDM, preparation of the President's Budget. The process is also interactive with the MACOM, accepting input in the form of Command Plans, Troops Lists, PDEP, Command Conference input, etc. The result of this process is a series of adjustments in authorizations continuing into the early part of the Current Year.

The problems of synchronizing the unit design process with authorization systems and those which account for approved authorizations was recognized by the Army's top management and resulted in an ongoing effort to simplify the accounting system, dampen and increase lead times for change, and provide improved ADP support for the process. Two messages, Documentation Modernization Message One and Two, have provided detailed guidance on how a series of fundamental changes will streamline and harness the process.

CHAPTER VI

THE PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

This review of the US Army's personnel distribution system will be discussed in three parts. Part one will be the Enlisted distribution system, part two will be the officer distribution system and part three will address the distribution process in USAREUR.

The start point for distributing personnel is the Army's priorities as published annually by the DCSOPS in the DA Master Priority List (DAMPL). Units are assigned a five-digit DAMPL sequence number, the fifth DAMPL digit is the unit's priority for personnel resources. The DA DCSPER expands the DAMPL priority to provide more discrete information needed to insure qualitative as well as quantitative unit fill. The DCSPER policy guidance is forwarded to USAMILPERCEN in the form of a Personnel Management Authorization Document/Distribution plan/policy guidance for both officer and enlisted personnel. USAMILPERCEN must further refine the DA policies (DAMPL/PMAD/Distribution plan) to accommodate a myriad of variables impacting on both officer and enlisted unit strength (e.g., unit activations, modernization, CMF strength, ETS/DEROS dates, space imbalances, individual considerations).

The above simplification of personnel priorities is but the first step of many in the personnel distribution system. The priority is only an expression of who gets what. Key to unit readiness is the qualitative fill of personnel, and this is the bottle-neck for the personnel managers who make the ultimate decisions. Priorities and TOE are idealistic while the boots on the ground unit strength reflects the reality

of moveable qualified soldiers at a given point in time. USAMILPERCEN thus inherits the unenviable job of distributing the shortages in an attempt to balance unit strengths Army-wide in accordance with established policies/priorities.

PART 1 - ENLISTED DISTRIBUTION

Each month USAMILPERCEN prepares an enlisted distribution plan based on a 10 month strength projection. Approximately 25 percent of the soldiers included in the distribution plan are not yet in the Army, in fact most have not visited a recruiting office. The Army's Enlisted personnel distribution system is driven by requisitions submitted each month by requisition agencies (e.g., oversea MACOM, CONUS divisions/installations, Agencies, HQ). The requisition is a request for a (replacement) soldier, by seven character MOS:

CHAR	IDENTIFIES	EXAMPLE
1st	occupational area	1
2nd	career group	11
3rd	MOS	11B
4th	skill level	11B3
5th	special qualification	11B3P
6th & 7th	additional skill identifies	11B3PW7

The requisitions are prepared several months in advance of the actual requirement (e.g., overseas units prepare 11 months in advance of requirement month, CONUS commands 7 months. Requisitions for personnel with special qualification/long school courses (e.g., Language training requiring two years of training) are submitted up to 24 months in advance of requirement month and they are based on known and projected requirements. The requisitions are forwarded through channels to USAMILPERCEN. At Corps/Installation/DA MACOM level the requisitions are validated to preclude under/over requisitioning.

Units prepare requisitions based on latest VTAADS data. MACOM validates requisitions on VTAADS/PERSACS data. USAMILPERCEN validates and assigns based on Personnel Management Authorization Document (PMAD is a scrubbed PERSAC) and current DCSPER guidance. The time lag between VTAADS and PERSACS causes some ripples in the distribution system (i.e., VTAADS updated monthly and PERSACS updated semi-annually). Note that printed documents (e.g., TOE) are not the basis for unit personnel requisitions. The VTAADS data received each month (i.e., SIDPERS roster C-54) is far more current than the printed document, and VTAADS is normally the best document to use in order to reflect current/correct authorizations.

Many things can happen between the time a personnel requisition is submitted and the requirement month (e.g., local redistribution, promotion/demotion, new arrival, unit strength authorization changes, DA policies change).

After edit and validation at USAMILPERCEN an automated system screens the enlisted file and nominates soldiers for the assignment. The computer generated nominations are reviewed by assignment managers who make the final accept/reject decision on the nomination. Requisitions are filled by order of relative priority (DAMPL + DCSPER Guidance). When a shortage of soldiers exists, the shortage is shared by all requisitioning activities according to priority.

The enlisted distribution process concludes with accepted nominations being converted to a soldier's assignment instructions, with both the losing and gaining command receiving the notification.

Of course many things can and do happen (e.g., delay/deferment, revocation, diversion) to assigned soldiers between the time USAMILPERCEN issues the assignment instructions and the time the soldier reports to his new unit. However, all things considered, the system functions extremely well when one considers the magnitude of the job, the fact that most units make ALO each month, high retention/reenlistment rates, strong recruiting success, low training attrition, the many individual problems, and the myriad force structure changes.

Key to quality distribution of both the enlisted and the officer force are timeliness and accuracy of the supporting data bases. Personnel authorizations must be approved and quickly posted to the PERSACS, field SIDPERS input must be timely and accurate, and both individual enhancements (e.g., additional skill identifier) and limitations (e.g., permanent profile) must be kept current.

PART 2 - OFFICER DISTRIBUTION

The officer distribution process is influenced by many factors (e.g., authorizations, assets, priorities); however, the two factors which impact most is the competition for talent (from both within the military and from civilian industry) and the continuing short notice force changes. The officer personnel manager's job is one of the most difficult in the entire Army. All factors impacting on officer distribution are in a constant state of change. The managers try very hard to insure all requisitioning agencies receive a fair share of all the available officer assets, according to established priorities.

The Army's tool to insure fair share in officer distribution is called the Officer Distribution Plan (ODP). The ODP is developed annually in the month of December. It brings into balance assets,

authorizations and priorities. The HQDA ODP distributes officers by grade and specialty to the DA MACOM/Agencies. These MACOM/Agencies then prepare their own ODP.

The ODP is developed from a projected inventory of officers who will be in the Army during the term of the plan (normally one year). The inventory identifies the officers by grade and specialty. The inventory is then compared to the personnel management authorization document (PMAD-developed by the DCSPER from the PERSACS and other HQDA Priorities/policies). The results of the inventory-PMAD comparison usually result in a shortage of grades and specialties to meet the officer needs of the Army, and a computer routine called the Personnel Priority Model (PMM) is used to resolve the differences identified. The PPM is DAMPL based, thus the DCSOPS DAMPL is the tool used to distribute personnel shortages (both officer and enlisted).

Officer requisitions are submitted on a bimonthly basis. CONUS commands submit requisitions for replacement officers to arrive during the fifth and sixth month after requisition and oversea commands submit their requisitions for replacement officer to arrive during the ninth and tenth month after submission. (NOTE: the comments on officers also apply to warrant officers except that warrant officers requirements are not graded).

Officers with special qualifications (e.g., language training) are also distributed in the above described manner except that the planning process could cover a period of two-three years. Medical, Judge Advocate and Chaplain corps officers are distributed by their respective department chiefs.

PART 3 - USAREUR

The USAREUR distribution process works approximately the same as the standard Army system. The exceptions to the standard Army system are dictated by unit readiness constraints, operational requirements and DA policies.

The above cited three reasons why USAREUR's personnel distribution cannot exactly follow the Army standard will be discussed in some detail. The first consideration at the CINC level is that he is responsible for all 200,00 personnel in USAREUR, and his decisions must insure as fair treatment to all the commands, missions and personnel as possible. Of course, the primary and constant distribution priority is the maneuver units (deterrent force); however, there are times when the veterinarian meat inspector in Denmark or the nuclear custodian in Greece/Turkey billets must also be given special consideration. It is for these and the reasons listed below that the CINC and his personnel managers must almost daily take some personnel action to insure the readiness/operational requirements are met and/or DA policies complied with.

The CINC and his staff must insure units attain the assigned personnel ALO. This would appear an easy task with approximately 6500 replacements arriving in theater each month. The task takes on a different complexion when one considers that approximately seventy percent of each month's arrivals are preassigned (normally, all E5 and above, non-FRG and accompanied personnel).

The CINC and his personnel managers have only the monthly E4 and below arrivals with which to influence near term theater units ALO attainment. Clearly one cannot influence senior grade achievement with

the E4 and below personnel; so, the USAREUR personnel managers must be very accurate with their projections, requisitions and assignments made several months prior to the NCO/officer arriving in theater (and any adjustments thereto).

The following are some examples of USAREUR personnel distribution problems and why the CINC and his personnel managers must daily take some action to insure unit readiness/operational requirements are met:

- CONUS assignment failures which require approximately 125 personnel be placed on orders to get 100 to USAREUR (a USAREUR unit no-show rate of forty percent).

- Geographic dispersion of units and subelements of units (e.g., 59th ORD BDE, 32nd AADCOM, Corps Support units).

- Permanent change of station (PCS) constraints, especially costly for accompanied personnel. Soldiers/families can't be ordered from Frankfurt to Stuttgart to meet an urgent requirement as can be done at CONUS posts due to funding constraints and morale implications.

- Frequent Force structure changes and modernization efforts.

- Unprogrammed personnel losses and tour curtailments.

- Concurrent travel limitations (housing, etc.).

- Special Medical/schooling requirements.

- Data base accuracy and requisitions lead time.

- Operational requirements.

- Major training area

- FTX

- ATT

- Community requirements

- Support base

- Service member professional development.

- PRP disqualifications and one-person deep operations in the dispersed units (corps support units, 32nd AADCOM and 59th ORD in FRG and all units in non-FRG countries).

- Possible usurpation of commander prerogatives.

Department of the Army Policies (although very sound and serving the best interest of the service member) often constrain USAREUR personnel distribution efforts to the detriment of unit readiness and operational requirements. Some examples are:

- PCS constraints that preclude moving a service member (and family) during last 12 months of the tour. This constraint does not exist at the CONUS post because no PCS funds are involved for intra post moves (e.g., from Fort McPherson to Fort Gillam, from HQ III Corps to 2d AD) and there is no limiting factor of an 18 month-36 month tour with a DEROS date.

- Requirements that personnel with special requirements can only be stationed so many miles from a large hospital/school.

- Physical profiles.

- Professional development/AERB needs.

- Christmas early out program.

- Response time to replace soldiers deleted/deferred/fill emergency requisitions (especially for remote areas).

- Tour curtailments.

- Modernization efforts.

It is for all the above cited reasons that the CINC and his staff must be on top of the personnel situation on a daily basis. The command could not survive if held to all personnel distribution decisions made six to twenty-four months prior to the replacement service member arriving in the command.

CHAPTER VII

THE ARMY UNIT STATUS REPORTING SYSTEM

The System

AR 20-1 establishes the Army Unit Status Reporting (USR) System which is compatible with the JCS Unit Status and Identity Report (UNITREP) System. Generally, this system requires monthly reports from Active Component battalions and separate companies and detachments in the following readiness categories: personnel strength, equipment on hand, equipment readiness, training, and an overall evaluation. Readiness Condition (REDCON) criteria are established in each of these categories for three levels of combat readiness (C-1, C-2, and C-3). Units not meeting the minimum requirements of the C-3 category are generally considered "not combat ready"--commanders have the option, with justification, of subjectively upgrading the overall rating even though the criteria for one or more of the individual categories dictate a lower rating.

The purpose of the USR system is to provide the Army management structure information on the current readiness of Army units and indicators of factors which degrade unit readiness. The report assists managers in the allocation of resources. It identifies differences between current personnel and equipment support levels and wartime requirements, and it aids in determining Army-wide conditions and trends.

The goal of the reporting system is to gauge the match of unit readiness conditions with a pre-determined unit support level or Authorized Level of Organization (ALO). Management attention is generally focused on units which report REDCONs below ALO.

USAREUR USR Reporting and This Study

In this study, the USRs for a sample of USAREUR units (i.e., those of VII Corps and the 21st Support Command) were used to gauge the impact on readiness of current resource management systems and programs. The readiness category within these USRs which has most relevance for this study is Personnel Inventory, and that is the primary category analyzed.

CHAPTER VIII

MANPOWER CONSTRAINTS ON USAREUR

Army End-Strength

The Army's active component authorizations remained constant at the 781,000 level over the period FY 81 thru FY 84. They are planned to remain so thru FY 85. Planned growth in authorizations of some 4% over the period FY 85 thru FY88 has fallen out of the projections and a steady-state authorization level is projected. This has required Army planners to review programs which required the ramp-ups in authorizations to the projected FY 88 level. USAREUR participated in this program review and has scaled back authorization growth to accommodate straight line projections.

European Troop Strength Ceiling

The FY 83 DOD Appropriations Act provided an additional restriction on USAREURs end-strength. It addressed all services and placed a cap on strength by requiring that the number of US military personnel stationed in Western and Southern Europe at the end of FY 83 not exceed the planned number of personnel at the end of FY 82 which was 315,600. The Army's share of the end-FY 82 projection was 217,100. USAREUR planners are projecting steady-state end-strength at approximately this level through FY 89 and scaling back planned growth in programs to accommodate this level. For planning purposes, it is this Congressionally mandated ceiling and not Army-wide strength projections which drive USAREURs end-strength projections.

CHAPTER IX

STRATEGIES EMPLOYED TO LIMIT USAREUR'S GROWTH IN AUTHORIZATIONS TO ACCOMMODATE STRAIGHT LINE PROJECTIONS

In 1983, Army force planners viewed the future through an Army Plan which projected authorizations for Europe on an up-ramp to 221.7 thousand in FY 85 and further upward to 226.5 thousand in FY 87. This plan was incompatible with the congressionally mandated strength ceiling and Europe's share of the Army's 781 thousand steady-state out-year strength projections. Much of this Army Plan growth was associated with DA-wide reorganizations and force modernization efforts which were well beyond the planning stage and were necessary to keep USAREUR competent on the current battlefield. This situation required the reexamination of all programs associated with USAREUR authorizations and the prioritization of all existing programs as well as those supporting additional authorizations.

The reduction effort for FY 83 involved, principally, reducing a USAREUR overstrength condition while leaving authorizations above the ceiling level. This resulted in a lack of full support for authorizations or "hollowness". Efforts for FY 84 were aimed at reducing authorizations so that they would align with the strength ceiling and the USAREUR fair-share of the Army's 781 thousand straight-line projection. This involved eliminating slightly less than 600 spaces from the structure and was accomplished by eliminating selected Military Intelligence and Engineer (ADM) units from the programmed structure and the reduction of planned growth in a number of programs.

The requirement to reduce structure for FY 85 increased almost ten-fold over the FY 84, 600(-) space requirement. Major reductions were made through "Division 86" redesign, reducing planned growth in communications activities, and the elimination of over-resourcing of force modernization associated with major systems fielding--Patriot, Pershing II, and Multiple Launch Rocket System. Adjustments of unit Authorized Level of Authorization (ALO) both upward and downward were also employed to prioritize support levels within the authorized ceiling.

Decisions are presently being made to eliminate growth in authorizations during FY 86 and the out-years. The USAREUR effort in this regard is occurring within the framework of this command guidance:

- Balance around 2 Corps, 4 2/3 Divisions
- Standardize
- Retain unit flags
- Retain maximum combat deterrence
- Reduce non-divisional units above Level 2
- Fix program turbulence
- Reduce or inactive headquarters before troop units

In practice, this effort involves adjusting levels of organization in both directions to reflect mission priorities, inactivations and activations, reduced growth in selected programs and civilianization. The major structure adjustments planned for FY 84 thru FY 88 listed by Force Accounting System Standard Requirements Code (SRC) are provided at ANNEX C to APPENDIX. Planned civilianization activities, listed by functional area are provided at ANNEX D to APPENDIX.

CHAPTER X

IMPACT OF STRENGTH CEILINGS, REDUCED AUTHORIZATIONS AND FORCE MODERNIZATION ON USAREUR

Faced with an end-strength ceiling and steady-state authorization projections for the Army, USAREUR made a conscious effort to reduce authorizations, within the command to supportable levels. Unit Status Reports (USR) for April 1984 indicate that this strategy has been successful in allowing reporting units to achieve readiness, to a high degree, in the personnel area. In this reporting period, over 90% of these units achieved Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) standards. The two sample organizations for this study, VII Corps and the 21st Support Command both approximated the USAREUR average with the latter unit scoring higher than the former.

It should be kept in mind that the USR is widely felt to be an imperfect measure of unit readiness, so the achievement of these goals do not equate directly to an ability to engage in sustained combat. These achievements do, however, indicate that reporting units were able to assemble the requisite personnel strength, with the proper number of senior grade personnel, in the proper mix of skills to meet Department of the Army mandated goals.

An additional factor should be kept in mind when viewing USR personnel achievement, and that is that USR goals are established by factoring a unit's required strength against its level of organization which roughly equates to its ALO. In reviewing the ALOs of VII Corps and the 21st Support Command the following is indicated:

- A significant number of VII Corps maneuver units, combat support elements, headquarters, and, to a much less extent, support units are at ALO 1.

- Over 50% of 21st Support Command reporting units are below ALO 2.

It can be concluded, therefore, that USAREUR has used ALO designations to establish manning priorities, that the personnel system has been able to meet, to a large extent, the inventory requirements of the combined required/ALO requirements of the USR system, and that the support elements studied are not generally part of an "ALO 2 Army". So while the "hollowness" defined as the delta between authorized and available strength has been eliminated by USAREUR's successful paring down of structure, the delta between required and ALO authorizations remains in the sample support units.

It is of note, also, that a review of recent USRs reveals that ALO 1 units appear to have difficulty managing their personnel within the close tolerances that this designation allows, and a higher than average proportion of ALO 1 units fail to meet their objectives. This problem would appear to be exacerbated by planned "Army of Excellence" initiatives which will raise the ALO of heavy division maneuver elements.

Finally, a prevalent feeling within USAREUR is that the movement, over time, of sustaining forces from the structure creates a serious wartime problem which is not amenable to solution under present strength ceilings.

CHAPTER XI

USAREUR ENVIRONMENT AND IMPACT OF NEW SYSTEMS FIELDING

The US Army, Europe, is many things to many people. Its population is larger than that of several United Nations members. It is the largest, and most powerful military force ever deployed overseas in a deterrent/peaceful role. The comparisons that could be drawn are many and varied; so, suffice it here to say USAREUR is a unique force deployed several thousand miles from its homeland in a deterrent role, a force of such importance and political power that it evokes perceptions and influences events never before in a land force's realm of possibility.

Prior to discussing the USAREUR environment it is necessary to review the purpose of this writing (i.e., Study Impact of Modernization) and to discuss the impact of new systems fielding and added missions without compensating manpower on USAREUR units and soldiers. It is emphasized all Army elements will experience the same general manpower hardships associated with modernization and added missions without compensating manpower; however, the manpower hardships in USAREUR are greatly exacerbated due to the greatly inefficient troop stationing scheme.

Because of West Germany's limited real estate and to save billions of dollars, after WW II, the US Army elected to use existing pre-WW I and WW II German Kasernes for its garrisons. These were many small installations designed for a particular type unit (e.g., Tank battalion, HQ, etc.). Thus troop stationing was not determined by what was most

cost effective but by the number of soldiers or items of equipment the Kaserne would support, and the typical large American CONUS style installation which produces manpower and monetary economies was forsaken. There are significant economies (manpower, monetary and other resources) derived from a division/corps size post in CONUS as opposed to a division/corps in West Germany operating from thirty to more than one hundred small Kasernes.

As an example of CONUS economy units at most posts can road march to nearby training areas for live fire and maneuver training. This is not the case in West Germany where rail movement for track vehicles and long marches on congested Autobahns are necessary to get the wheel vehicles to major training areas. This takes several hundred thousand manhours and dollars out of USAREUR's annual budget. Budgets can be plused up with dollars, but, unfortunately, the Army's TOE are not increased to provide the additional manpower necessary to operate from the many small Kasernes in West Germany.

All facets of daily life in USAREUR are greatly impacted by this dispersed stationing. The major cost disadvantages (as compared to a large CONUS post) are manpower, energy, facility maintenance and overhead operations. The following paragraphs will discuss some of the more costly manhour related events associated with fielding new equipment at the maneuver unit, support unit and HQ Staff levels in USAREUR.

At the maneuver unit level there is a tremendous surge of additional manhours worked to ready displaced equipment, associated material and supplies for turn in. Then the pain of extra hours worked is again experienced as new equipment, materiel and supplies are received, personnel accomplish the necessary maintenance and operation training, and the

unit is quickly readied for possible combat operations. Insuring adequate supplies, parts and materiel are in the pipeline to support the new equipment is also accomplished at this time. Now the lengthy process of detailed fighting team and maneuver unit training necessary for combined arms fighting is initiated. Continued fine tuning of support systems (i.e., supply, maintenance, administration) is accomplished throughout the new equipment training period and thereafter.

While the maneuver unit goes through the preparation and turn in of the old, and receive and ready the new cycle only once, support units must face the required manpower surge time and time again until all supported units have transitioned to the new equipment. Frequently support units find both old and new equipment moving through their facility (though not from the same maneuver unit) and the associated deluge of supplies and repair parts, all of which must be accurately accounted for and records/files posted. Thus the manpower surge required to support new equipment fielding in support units could last for a year or longer as compared to approximately twelve weeks in a maneuver unit. As will be discussed later the primary disadvantages in USAREUR support units in fielding new equipment is decentralized and dispersed operations. The large CONUS post support element enjoys a significant economy of scale advantage over the USAREUR support unit.

Headquarters Staff personnel also must work additional hours to support new equipment fielding. These personnel perform the critical task of planning, coordinating and supervising the transition. As the

displaced equipment could go to another active unit, the reserve components, or foreign military sales the staff must insure both the maneuver unit and the support unit have processed the equipment to standards. Purging old supplies and parts from support systems and timely addition of new parts and supplies is also a major oversight responsibility of the staff. All of these staff activities could become a minor task for the Headquarters compared to the troublesome events following the fielding of new equipment. Obtaining training facilities to exercise and fire the weapons, adjusting General Defense Plans to take advantage of the new capability, integrating new doctrine (or assisting in the development of new doctrine), obtaining personnel replacements, receiving publications and adjusting stockage lists are but a few of the new equipment problems that create a dreadful workload for the staff.

Due to recent doctrinal changes which have eliminated great numbers of support personnel from division units (e.g., cooks, personnel, and administration, finance and the status of DISCOM elements--maintenance, supply, medical--is unclear at this time) USAREUR (and similar operational elements) may be required to significantly increase TDA augmentation of these units to insure peacetime missions and responsibilities are adequately resourced.

Experience to date indicates that USAREUR personnel at all levels are accomplishing the fielding of new equipment in high spirit and with distinction. However, it is not believed all support units can sustain the current level of effort without an adverse effect on USAREURs' war capability in support systems (i.e., things normally done by the manpower currently being directed to modernization).

As previously stated the perceptions of USAREUR are many and varied. For the purposes of this writing it is appropriate to review commonly held perceptions of USAREUR as the on-the-ground representative of America in Western Europe. Views will include how West Europeans perceive USAREUR, how the Soviets perceive USAREUR, how USAREUR perceives itself, how American business interest perceive (and use) USAREUR and some other unrelated perceptions.

The world perception of US Army, Europe, is that America honors its commitments and stands strongly with NATO even at great cost to the US taxpayers. The majority of West Europeans are sincerely grateful to America for supporting such a large land force so far from its homeland. To most West Europeans USAREUR is America. How its soldiers behave in public places is how Americans behave (this applies to both military personnel and their family members).

The most meaningful perception conveyed by USAREUR is a "viable deterrent". This operational field Army deployed in Western Europe telegraphs a clear message to the Kremlin, i.e., Soviet expansion into West Europe stops here. This has held since the late forties; and, this US commitment to peace has contributed greatly to the stability, healthy self-image and worldly contributions of West European nations. The West Europeans correctly see USAREURs rule as deterring war with the Soviets and thus assisting in preserving our Western way of life and denying the large West Europe Industrial Base to the Soviets.

As the Soviet Union has only one source of national power (i.e., Military Forces) USAREURs deployed combat-ready forces are the major component of NATO efforts to deny Soviet hegemony in Western Europe. Soviet expansionism in other parts of the world clearly indicate Air and Sea Forces and threats to defend will not inhibit the Soviets. However,

Western Europe has not given up any territory to the Soviets since NATO's creation. Five US combat divisions in a ready force of 200,000 deployed on freedom's frontier is a plain message the Soviets understand and respect.

The Europeans more than any other peoples appreciate that only a capable ground force can defeat a threat of the Soviet variety. No Air Force, no Sea Force, no Political initiative will deter the Soviets in the successful manner done by the US Army, Europe. History is replete with examples of Air and Sea Forces failing to defeat an adversary (e.g., the allied bombings of Germany in WW II, Japan's emphasis on Sea power). All the successful great and final conflicts belong to the ground forces, even in this age of missiles and destructive nuclear weapons. The Europeans (both West and East) have experienced more savage ground wars than any other peoples, and perhaps it is for this reason that US Army, Europe has such a special meaning (positive for the West and inhibiting for the East) for the Europeans.

The US derives a great benefit (many informed leaders would argue a far greater) from having a field Army deployed in Western Europe, as do our European Allies. No one who understands the costs and benefits of power projection would suggest we should permit a Soviet takeover of West Europe. Having a force of USAREURs size and recognized capabilities on the ground in Europe in close proximity to where its units will fight is worth billions to the US:

- a. Dollar saving to rapidly deploy such a force in a crisis.
- b. Practice and experience daily the realities of coalition warfare.

c. Frequent Interoperability Training for both individual soldiers and units.

d. Communications security training and evaluations in an operational environment.

e. Host nation contributions to coalition warfare.

f. Equipment, parts, supplies, ammo that is (and is not) interchangeable.

g. Doctrinal adjustments necessary for coalition war.

h. Netting capabilities of NATO communications equipment.

i. Difficulties in allocating and controlling Air and Sea space.

j. Military liaison missions provide opportunities to collect invaluable information on Soviet forces, their equipment and doctrine.

k. Returning soldiers are better US citizens for having experienced West European culture and history. Seeing the many US goods and services exported to Europe will also have a lasting impact.

The individual soldier serving in the US Army, Europe, lives an experience most Americans would not believe possible. These soldiers are marvelous for their contributions, dedication, and high spirited accomplishments in spite of some chilling realities:

a. For most soldiers separation from family and loved ones for periods of eighteen to forty-two months.

b. Living in sub-standard accommodations.

c. Frequent field training in the wet and cold of Europe.

d. USAREUR soldiers maintain a constant state of readiness, with many soldiers required to be ready to fight in minutes.

e. Many perform duty eye-to-eye with Warsaw pact forces twenty-four hours a day.

f. Frequent non-duty readiness tests which require personnel to move from their living quarters, assemble weapons and equipment and occupy an assembly area in hours.

g. All the associated all night guard duty, charge of quarters and other watch tours required to safeguard property, insure the readiness response time and insure personal safety.

h. Active field training and garrison soldiering in an atmosphere of "must be ready for combat", with tours of duty ranging from eighteen to forty-two months.

American business also receives great benefits from the large numbers of US Forces deployed in West Europe. The density of US soldiers and their family members in West Europe make it profitable for firms to permanently locate outlets and/or service centers in Europe. Over time many of these have proved to be an inroad to doing business in the private sectors of these countries (e.g., IBM, Airlines, Banks, GM, Ford, soft drink firms, recording firms, clothing firms, and many others). The US forces initially provided the support base from which to expand to the private sector; this was followed by a sustaining amount of sales to the military. Today many of these US firms do as much (or more) business in the European markets as they do in the States and thus no longer depend on Military sales. However, one must remember how they began their expansion to overseas markets and the great economic boost the US Army has thus provided our economy. US Army, Europe, has and continues to provide thousands of jobs and great amounts of investments for Americans at home.

CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions were drawn from this study effort:

1. The elaborate force sizing system described earlier in this report is largely academic in USAREUR. The overriding consideration effecting the force structure effort is constant-state strength projections and the desire to keep the force structure in line with the available inventory. Within these limits, Headquarters, USAREUR must balance war-fighting capability with sustainment of the peacetime force.

2. Headquarters, USAREUR appears very much in the drivers seat in the force structure planning process. The command has assembled a competent FMD staff, has assumed positive control of the FAS and VTAADS data base, and has insisted on a voice in every structure adjustment.

3. USAREUR has been willing to pay the manpower costs associated with Force Modernization staffing. They have developed a Force Modernization infrastructure, in many cases "out of their own hide", which reaches down to Division level and below. There is evidence that they have assigned some of their most talented people in this area.

4. The Force Modernization infrastructure has developed a strong stove-pipe character with practitioners talking to one another and interacting with the data base. Numerous small, short-fuse adjustments are made to the structure completely within this organization.

5. The adjustments that USAREUR directed to accommodate strength ceilings resulted from a total review of all programs effecting the structure. This effort appears to have been a carefully thought-out

adjustment utilizing the full range of tools available to force structure planners, e.g., activations, inactivations, ALO adjustments, paring down of authorizations, civilianization and host nation support.

6. Notwithstanding the effort put into this program and the successes USAREUR has had in this area, there remain some unresolved issues in the Force Modernization area:

a. TOEs necessary to access the impact of planned structure change and to implement this change, are often developed late by TRADOC. For example, the pared down "Army of Excellence" heavy division base TO&Es have not yet been published although implementation starts the fall of 1984. One of the impacts of this late development is that these documents will not get an adequate field "scrub" prior to implementation. Past experience indicates that this will necessitate numerous amendments before a set of workable documents will result.

b. Related to the problem identified in the previous paragraph is the late development of other documentation required by the force modernization effort. The whole documentation package (e.g., TO&E, MTO&E, QQPRI, BOIP) must be available on a timely basis if longer lead time increments of the fielding effort are to remain synchronized. It was reported, for example, that USAREUR received the M1 Tank BOIP eighteen months before equipment fielding and that the MTO&E was not finalized until three weeks prior to beginning New Equipment Training.

c. Late development of documentation and short-fuse schedule changes have a major impact on soldier utilization, housing decisions and family support. For example, a ten month TACFIRE delay resulted in

seventeen systems trained NCOs being malassigned and their reduced in-theater retainability after receipt of TACFIRE. M1 Tank schedule slippage required that forty-five NCOs be deferred.

d. Efforts to keep Military Construction Army (MCA) projects in sync with force modernization changes have not been totally successful, nor does there appear to be a good way to keep a visible linkage between MCA and Force Modernization actions.

e. New systems fielding plans do not identify all ancillary equipment. Shortfalls often must be rectified through off-line methods. An example of this was the requirement to remove items from POMCUS to support Pershing II fielding.

f. The FAS does not provide a good audit trail of changes. This makes it difficult to restore spaces to programs which are rejuvenated. An example cited was the planned elimination of cooks from the structure to accommodate "Unit Pack" feeding. This function, it is felt, will be restored, but it will be difficult to determine where these cook spaces were reallocated in the FAS to restore them to this function.

7. It is generally felt that the sustainability of USAREUR has been placed at some risk by eliminating or weakening combat service support elements. Strength limitations do not allow a forward stationed solution to this problem, and it was pointed out that force structure changes should be continually compared to Time Phased Force Deployment Lists (TPFDL) to optimize the impact of the aggregate of forward deployed forces and those providing rapid reinforcement.

8. The scheduling of new equipment into the theater has stretched to near capacity the support system's ability to refurbish/rebuild the displaced equipment. This requirement should be considered in scheduling new equipment fielding.

9. Because of its mission, USAREUR is required to maintain on a continuous basis, a high state of combat readiness. This frequently requires redundancy between old and new equipment during the new equipment fielding process. In the past, increases in personnel to support this redundancy came out of USAREURs hide. Strength ceilings reduce the command's ability to absorb this overhead. This has prompted USAREUR to suggest, in a case-by-case basis, fielding plans which have been debugged in CONUS prior to implementation in USAREUR and alternatives to new equipment issue in Europe.

10. Much thought is being given to a short war scenario in Europe (D to less than D+30). This discussion poses a danger that resources providers will fund to meet short war requirements and short change long term war fighting capabilities.

11. It was discovered that USAREUR MACOM were not using all the tools available to them to keep track of changes in authorization system. Specifically, they were not validating personnel authorization data on the VTAADS run provided to them monthly by HQ, USAREUR. Because the VTAADS data is the sole source for unit authorizations and thus personnel requisitions, assignments and management decisions, it is important that the data be accurate. The time window of this report is being extended and other simple modifications are possible to make it a more valuable strength management tool. Proper validation of this VTAADS run would assist in overcoming the frequently voiced complaint that MACOM do not have timely visibility on approved force structure changes.

12. The USAREUR environment (i.e., dispersed troop stationing, multiplicity of installations (communities), density populated areas, operational command, significant security requirements, etc.) consumes approximately 1.5 percent of the command's present for duty strength. A single comparison will highlight this issue: there are approximately 45,000 soldiers and 100,00 family members at Fort Hood, Texas; and, there is only one manned gate (East Gate). The other gates are open/not manned. In USAREUR there could be several hundred personnel (UP/Gate Guards/Security Force) employed in providing physical security to 145,000 Americans. Physical security and the operation of the many small Kasernes require the majority of the forces in the estimated 1.5 percent of manpower required to exist/conduct operations in the USAREUR environment.

CHAPTER VIII

RECOMMENDATIONS

That:

1. The low ALO condition of support units in USAREUR not lose visibility in the "ALO II Army" rhetoric emanating from Department of the Army.

2. Related to paragraph 1, above, acceptance of a fair-share portion of Army steady-state strength projections and the mandated Europe strength ceiling not generate an excessive "Can-do" attitude and stifle discussion of the structural weaknesses, especially in the sustainment area, of USAREUR.

3. Realistic and frequent assessments be made of transition-to-war plans to insure that shortfalls are sufficiently covered over time by compensating measures like CONUS reinforcement, host nation support, and plans for host nation civilian employee use during time of war.

4. USAREUR continue to place priority on Force Modernization efforts to minimize the turbulence of this program.

5. Alternative methods to USAREUR fielding (testing) of new systems be explored on a system-by-system basis to reduce overhead requirements and degraded readiness in USAREUR (i.e., successfully field/debug in CONUS then deploy to the overseas commands).

6. The Army leadership caution all senior leaders to refrain from talking up the short war scenario in Europe. Guidance should be to structure/design for a protracted war (Forces, support and industrial

base) but insure a constant capability to fight heavy forces in Central Europe in a short warning (3-7 days) scenario.

7. All DA MACOM require their subordinate command space managers to validate/correct data in the monthly VTAADS tape prior to start of the personnel requisition process.

8. All Headquarters from Department of the Army through Installation (community in Europe) require the preparation of a monthly modernization status report (hopefully through means of automation and a relational data management program, such as R:base 4000). The Headquarters/command report should be the format at Annex E to Appendix. Each proponent staff element in the Headquarters/command responsible for modernization actions must be required to prepare a monthly status report of the modernization issues in their individual staff area of responsibility, perhaps in the following format at Annex F to Appendix.

9. USAREUR be provided manpower (military/civilian/contract) over and above MTOE/TDA authorization at a constant rate of 1.5 percent of total theater (i.e., all Army/other categories of personnel supported, not just USAREUR units) force supported. This allocation should be identified as an off-set to manpower consumed by the USAREUR environment.

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
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APPENDIX

FIGURES

JOINT PLANNING IMPACTING ON USAREUR ALO DEVELOPMENT



- JLRSA** – JOINT LONG RANGE STRATEGIC APPRAISAL
- JSPDSA** – JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING DOCUMENT
SUPPORTING ANALYSIS
- JSPD** – JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING DOCUMENT
- DG** – DEFENSE GUIDANCE
- JPAM** – JOINT PROGRAM ASSESSMENT MEMORANDUM
- JSCP** – JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN

TDA/T0&E DEVELOPMENT

COMMAND
LEVEL

ITEM


TDA
DEVELOPMENT

MACOM

DA

T0&E
DEVELOPMENT

MACOM



ANNEX C

AUTHORIZATION ADJUSTMENTS

SRC

ACTION

01-AVIATION	2 AVN GP HHCs REDUCED TO LEVEL 2 (FY86) 2 AVN BN HHCs REDUCED TO LEVEL 2 (FY86) 6 CORPS ATK BNs ACTIVATE (FY87-88)
03-NBC	ALL NBC UNITS REDUCED TO LEVEL 3 (FY86)
05-ENGINEER	7 CORPS ENGR BNs CONVERT TO MECH SRC AT LEVEL 3 (2 BNs PER YEAR STARTING IN FY86) 3 CBT HVY BNs REDUCED TO LEVEL 2 (FY86) 1 CBT HVY BN INCREASED TO LEVEL 2 (FY86) 3 ENGR BDE HHCs INCREASED TO LEVEL 2 (FY85-86) 4 BRIDGE COs INCREASED TO LEVEL 2 (FY85-86) 1 BRIDGE CO INCREASED TO LEVEL 3 (FY85) 4 ENGR BN MHDs INACTIVATED (FY86) 2 UTILITY DETs INACTIVATED (FY86) 1 MAB INACTIVATED (V CORPS FY86) TOPO AND ADM UNITS REDUCTED (FY85)
06-FIELD ARTILLERY	10-8" FA BNs REDUCED TO LEVEL 3 (FY86) 5-12 GUN BNs INCREASED TO 18 GUNS LEVEL 3 (FY87) 1-8" FA BN ACTIVATES (FY87) 12 CORPS 8" BNs INCREASED TO LEVEL 2 (FY88) 3 CORPS 155 FA BNs REDUCED TO LEVEL 3 (FY86) BUYS BACK 2 CORPS 155 FA BNs AT LEVEL 2 (FY88) 1 CORPS 155 FA BN INCREASED TO LEVEL 2 (FY88) 6 LANCE BNs REDUCED TO LEVEL 3 (FY86) 4 LANCE BNs INCREASED TO LEVEL 2 (FY88) 2 HHBs CORPS ARTY ACTIVATES (FY87) 2 MLRS BNs ACTIVATE (FY85-86) 2 TA BNs ACTIVATE (FY88)
07-INFANTRY	BUYS BACK 2 MECH INF BNs (FY88) 2 LRRP COs ACTIVATE (FY86)
08-MEDICAL	CANCELLED EVAC HOSP GROWTH (FY87) MAJOR HOSP OFF INCREASE (30 SPACES FY86)

SRCACTION

09-ORDNANCE
1 HHC AMMO GP INCREASED TO LEVEL 2 (FY86)
1 HHC AMMO GP INCREASED TO LEVEL 3 (FY86)
7 AMMO COs INCREASED TO LEVEL 2 (FY85-87)
9 EOD DETs INCREASED TO FULL AUTHORIZATIONS (FY84-85)
2 AMMO COs ACTIVATED (FY85-86)
59TH ORD BDE SPT BN ACTIVATES (FY85)
32 ADSCOM ACTIVATES (FY86)

11-SIGNAL
E CO 11TH SIG BN ACTIVATION CANCELLED (FY87)
2 HHC SIG BDEs INCREASE TO LEVEL 3 (FY85)
1 CBT AREA SIG BN INCREASE TO LEVEL 3 (FY87)
260 SPACES OF GROWTH REDUCED

12-ADJUTANT GENERAL
426 POSTAL SPACES CONVERTED TO CIV (FY86-88)
FY87 PROGRAM DIP ELIMINATED
4 DS PSC ACTIVATED (FY86)
4 DS PSC AUG PACKAGES ACTIVATED (FY86 ONLY)
74 DPU SPACES CONVERTED TO CIV (FY88)
RPC FULDA (TDA) INACTIVATES (FY86)
RPC NUERNBERG (TDA) REDUCED (FY87)

14-FINANCE
105 TRAVEL SPACES CONVERTED TO CIV (FY88)
FY87 DIP ELIMINATED

19-MILITARY POLICE
HMC MP GP TO BDE (FY85)
MP COs TO J EDITION LEVEL2 (FY85)
CINC 21ST & EUCOM SECURITY FORCE (FY85)

29-LOGISTIC SUPPORT
5 GS MAINT BN HHDs REDUCED TO LEVEL 3 (FY86)
1 HHC SPT GP REDUCED TO LEVEL 3 (FY89)
3 DS/GS MAINT BN HHDs REDUCED TO LEVEL 3 (FY86)
3 DS MAINT COs REDUCED TO LEVEL 3 (FY86)
5 HVY EQUIP GS MAINT COs REDUCED TO LEVEL 3 (FY86)
2 DS MANT COs INACTIVE (ACR 86) (FY86)
2 S&S BN HHCs REDUCED TO LEVEL 3 (FY86)
1 REPAIR PARTS CO REDUCED TO LEVEL 3 (FY86)
2 DPUs REDUCED (FY89)
S&S CO ACTIVATION CANCELLED (FY87)
1 DS MAINT CO ACTIVATES (FY86)
2 DS MAINT COs INCREASED TO LEVEL 3 (FY86)
13 DS MAINT COs (REAR) INCREASED TO LEVEL 3 (FY86-89)
9 S&S COs INCREASED TO LEVEL 3 (FY86)
HHC 1ST PERSCOM 121 SPACES CONVERT TO CIV (FY87-88)

34-INTELLIGENCE
1 AS CO ACTIVATES (FY87)
1 TAC EXP BN INCREASED TO LEVEL 3 (FY85)
1 OPS BN INCREASED TO LEVEL 2 (FY88)

SRC

ACTION

44-AIR DEFENSE

NIKE/HERC WARHEAD DET(SPT TO ALLIES) INACTIVES
(FY85-90)
2 CORPS ADA BNs ACTIVATE (FY86-87)

55-TRANSPORTATION

1 MOTOR TRANS GP HHC REDUCED TO LEVEL 3 (FY85)
2 LT/MED TRUCK COs REDUCED TO LEVEL 2 (FY85)
1 LT/MED TRUCK CO REDUCED TO LEVEL 3 (FY87)
1 MED TRUCK CO (POL) REDUCED TO LEVEL 2 (FY85)
2 SEMI TRAILER (PETRO) COs REDUCED TO LEVEL 3
(FY85)
1 MED HEL CO INCREASED TO LEVEL 2 (FY85)
HHC 4TH TRANSCOM INCREASED TO LEVEL 3 (FY85)
6 TRANS BN HHDs INCREASED TO LEVEL 3 (FY85)
2 HET COs ACTIVATE (FY86)
2 CORPS AVIM BNs INCREASED (FY86-88)

ANNEX D

PLANNED CIVILIANIZATION

FUNCTIONAL AREA	% OF FUNCTION CONVERTED
COMMUNITY STAFFS	47% FY87-88
CLUB MANAGEMENT	100% FY86-88
EO	47% FY87-88
ADAPCP	35% FY87-88
POSTAL	45% FY86-88
PERSONNEL (ADMIN)	17% FY87-88
FINANCE (TRAVEL)	52% FY87-88
OE	11% FY87-88
ENGR & HOUSING	57% FY87-88
FORCE MOD STAFFING	34% FY87-88

HQ/CMD MONTHLY MODERNIZATION STATUS

MOD ISSUE	1ST SYSTEM RECEIVED	TOTAL SYS TO RECEIVE	P+A	MCA	DOCTRINE	BOIP	QQPRI	BTOE	MTOE	NET	MTA	LTA	HOST NATION COORD.	PAO	OTHER	REMARKS
1. M1	JUN 83	XX	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
2. P2	DEC 83	XX														
3. APACHE	JAN 85	XX														

*ANNOTATE AS APPROPRIATE TO INDICATE CURRENT STATUS

(MONTH/YEAR)

**STATUS OF P + A
MOBILIZATION ISSUES**

MOD ISSUE	MTOE	PERS REQUISITIONS	PRINTING	ADP SUPPORT	POSTAL	MILPO SUPPORT	MWR	P + A FUNDS	P + A MCA	DISPLACED PERS	OTHER	REMARKS
1. M1, 1/37	*											
2. M1, 2/67												
3. APACHE, 502d												

***ANNOTATE EACH COLUMN WITH APPROPRIATE
INFORMATION TO INDICATE CURRENT STATUS**

END

FILMED

2-85

DTIC